In this blog post, we will take a deep look at whether human cloning is ethically and philosophically justified based on the arguments of Putnam and Harris.
Since Ian Wilmut and his team created the cloned sheep Dolly, there has been much debate about the pros and cons of human cloning. In addition, various works of art, such as “Gattaca” and “The Island,” have consistently appeared, hinting at the dangers of human cloning. As a result, the general public has developed a negative image of artificial intelligence and clones. Hilary Putnam argued that this “instinctive reaction” to human cloning is justified, but I believe that this reaction is somewhat distorted. Generally, keywords that trigger instinctive reactions do not evoke positive images in people. This may be because the aforementioned works of art have had a significant impact, and because these topics are still unfamiliar and may make people feel uncomfortable. The answer to the question of whether children born in a society where biotechnology is prevalent will have the same instinctive reaction as we do is probably “no.” If so, what would be a clearer basis for supporting or opposing human cloning?
In “The Genetic Revolution and Bioethics,” Hillary Putnam and John Harris made somewhat contradictory arguments. Putnam opposed human cloning, while Harris supported it. I partially agree with some of the arguments made by both scholars, but I disagree with others. However, I disagree with the decisive basis for their arguments. After criticizing the parts of their arguments that I do not find justified, I will explain why I ultimately oppose human cloning.
First, let us examine Putnam’s argument. Putnam argues that humans must have a desirable “moral ideal” for this world. Here, “moral ideal” does not refer to fundamental principles or rules, but rather a comprehensive and concrete image that emerges from the fusion of various values that exist in human society. In other words, it is not simply an abstract ideal or value, but a moral standard that corresponds to a practical image in human life. Moral standards that reflect the values of human society exist in various forms depending on the era and region, and the value of diversity must be emphasized in moral standards. On the other hand, before social groups of humans, there is a more fundamental group called the family, and the concept of family values also exists. Similar to moral values, family values are concrete images that represent the various values that make up a family group. Therefore, in order for diversity to be valued in moral values, it must first be valued in the more fundamental family values. However, human cloning violates human diversity and should therefore be prohibited at the family level. Here, I believe that Putnam’s argument that diversity is necessary at the family level is inappropriate. The argument that if a certain value (diversity) is necessary in a lower concept (moral values), then that value is also necessary in a higher concept (family values) is backwards. Rather, even if a certain value is necessary in a higher concept, it may not be necessary in a lower concept. In order to argue for the value of diversity in moral values, it must first be established that diversity is an important value in family values. Furthermore, there are no clear criteria for determining which moral values are desirable. Moral values that are considered desirable by group A may not be considered desirable by group B, and such differences in perspective have already been seen many times in human society. And I agree with Putnam’s argument that Kant’s maxim, “Human beings must be treated as ends, not as means,” must be upheld. However, as Harris argues, it is quite difficult to define the scope of human instrumentalization. It is inconsistent to argue that organ transplants, which are a relatively mild form of instrumentalization, are legal, while human cloning is not. Therefore, it is not appropriate to argue that anything that is not severe is acceptable and anything that is severe is unacceptable without specific criteria.
Let us now look at Harris’s argument. Harris argues that Kant’s maxim that humans should not be instrumentalized is correct, but that it is not appropriate to apply it to human cloning. For example, it is inconsistent to argue that blood transfusions are acceptable but human cloning is not. Furthermore, Putnam argues that diversity is necessary in the family, and that diversity can be achieved through “replication.” Harris argues that diversity can be achieved through human cloning, but I believe this is incorrect. In any society or era, the standards of beauty and preferred traits pursued by the majority of people are somewhat similar. In this situation, if parents can design their children (if they can choose through cloning), it is natural that most parents will choose the traits that are preferred at the time, and this choice will reduce diversity. Returning to Harris’s argument, he concludes that ethical issues must be verified by presenting concrete evidence and arguments. He then argues that, based on the reports of many philosophers and existing laws, there are sufficient grounds for supporting human cloning, and therefore he supports human cloning by induction. However, I do not believe that such reports and laws can serve as reasonable grounds. If the logic that the argument in favor of human cloning is valid because many reports and laws support human cloning is valid, then the argument against human cloning is also valid based on reports and laws that oppose human cloning. Therefore, I believe that Harris’s argument against human cloning is flawed.
Before I present my argument in detail, there is something I need to clarify. Let’s imagine that there is a machine that worsens psychological relationships with others. In the course of their lives, individuals live with countless other people, and while they gain happiness, they also suffer emotional pain. It is only natural that people suffer pain and their relationships with others deteriorate as they live their lives. However, does that mean it is desirable to operate a machine that causes relationships with others to deteriorate? Absolutely not. It is inevitable that evil occurs naturally, but it is not right to deliberately choose evil. In human society, there are values that can be divided into good and evil regardless of the situation. Good values include service, happiness, and solidarity, while evil values include hatred, murder, and revenge. Whether good or evil, these are values that we naturally feel as we live our lives as human beings, so it is not necessarily desirable to pursue good and undesirable to pursue evil. However, if we move from a concept that feels natural to a concept of choice, then choosing evil over good can be considered evil. The same applies to our expectations of others.
I believe that humans should not be expected to fulfill certain expectations of others as they grow up and are raised. Of course, there are various kinds of expectations. When raising children, parents may expect their children to be healthy, or they may expect their children to fulfill the dreams they themselves were unable to achieve. However, what I am referring to here is “expectations for cloned humans.” If people were to create cloned humans, what would be their reasons? The reasons are easy to imagine: to see someone they miss again, or to have a genius like Einstein, who only comes around once in a thousand years. Cloned humans created for these purposes are born with expectations based on the image of a person who already exists (or existed). People must form their own identities as they grow up, but being forced to grow up with the image of another person is a violation of human dignity. This kind of expectation is not desirable. Of course, it is natural to expect someone else to have the image of a person who already exists (or existed). For example, if a parent’s first child has a good education and excellent physical abilities, the parent may expect the same from their second child. However, such expectations are by no means desirable. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, if we have a choice between having undesirable expectations of our children and not having them, we should not choose to have them. The choice of whether or not to clone humans is tantamount to choosing whether or not to have undesirable expectations of children. Therefore, human cloning should be opposed.
Furthermore, even if human cloning is possible, it is impossible to create a completely identical person. Human cloning is basically the creation of a human being by replacing the nucleus of a fertilized egg with the nucleus containing the DNA of the original human being, but even identical twins, who have the same genes, develop completely different identities. Moreover, in the case of human cloning, the mitochondrial genes are different, so the degree of similarity is even smaller than that of identical twins. In other words, even identical twins have many differences, so it is meaningless to expect a cloned human to be identical to the original human. However, if a cloned child grows up with the expectation of becoming a specific person who already exists, the pain and personality infringement that child will experience will be severe. In this sense, the argument that “we should not expect a specific image of a person to be born” does not contradict Kant’s maxim, which both Putnam and Harris agree with.
It can be argued that the purpose of human cloning is not only to reproduce a specific person. However, there are clear risks associated with human cloning, and it is not right to approve of it. For example, if there were a game in which there was a 50% chance of becoming a billionaire and a 50% chance of your baby dying, no parent would play that game.
So far, I have criticized the arguments of Putnam and Harris and presented what I believe to be the decisive grounds for opposing human cloning. Putnam argued against human cloning based on Kant’s maxim, but his logical structure was inadequate in presenting the value of diversity. On the other hand, Harris argued that human cloning must be proven by evidence and reasoning, but his inductive reasoning in favor of human cloning based on philosophers’ reports and laws was not convincing. I argued that humans should not grow up with expectations of others, without violating Kant’s maxim. It is common for parents to have expectations of their children, but that does not mean that having expectations is desirable. If we have the choice of whether to have expectations of humans through human cloning, the correct attitude is not to choose to do so. Based on this argument, it is possible to oppose human cloning while still enjoying the benefits of life science technology other than human cloning. As long as we do not create humans with dignity, we can receive the gifts of life science technology, such as artificial organs and gene therapy.
