In this blog post, we will examine the logical similarities between value judgments, ethical inquiries, and science based on Karl Popper’s methodology of science.
Many philosophers of science have put forward their own theories on how science progresses and what the nature of science is. Among them, Karl Popper is perhaps the most widely known philosopher of science. In his book Conjectures and Refutations, Popper argued that science is an endless process of “conjecture and refutation” and presented a methodology for science. The methodology of science presented by Popper is similar to the way we explore values, or what we commonly refer to as ethical issues. We encounter problems in our daily lives. For example, there may be situations where we have to pass judgment on a crime, or where we want to determine whether light is a particle or a wave. Scientific explanations may be necessary to resolve these issues, and ethical issues may require justification of values or actions. Generally, the methodologies of science and ethics are thought to be very different because science is considered an objective and rational discipline, while ethics is considered a subjective and emotional discipline. So, in what ways are the methodologies of science and ethics similar? Let’s focus on the methodology of science proposed by Popper and compare it with the structure of value judgments.
The first is the deductive form. First, we need to understand the deductive method that Popper advocates as a method of scientific inquiry. Popper was strongly opposed to “inductivism.” The problem with induction is that inductive reasoning, which makes empirical generalizations from a few cases obtained through observation, cannot be logically proven no matter how many cases there are. As a simple example, suppose we need to prove the proposition “All swans are white.” To do so, we would need to investigate all swans, which is impossible. All swans include all swans on Earth and those that will be discovered in the future, and it is impossible to observe all of them, and there is no guarantee that the next swan we see will be white. Popper points out this problem with induction and argues that only deductive reasoning is meaningful because inductive reasoning cannot prove that a proposition is true. Let’s look at how Popper’s scientific explanation is structured. Here, all explanations are deductive processes. The conclusion of deduction is a statement about the object to be explained, and the premises of deduction are statements about the laws and conditions that explain it. An example of this will be shown with examples after explaining the structure of value exploration below.
In value exploration, the process of making value judgments is structured in the form of deductive syllogism. Deductive syllogism is a form consisting of a major premise (all humans die), a minor premise (Socrates is a human), and a conclusion (therefore, Socrates dies). When faced with an ethical problem, we identify the facts, principles, and norms related to the problem and make a judgment through a deductive process to determine which values are correct. Let’s compare each example.
1. Iron rusts when it combines with oxygen. (Universal law)
2. Object X (combined with oxygen) is iron. (Specific fact)
3. Therefore, X rusts. (Conclusion: subject of explanation)
1. Lying is wrong. (Value principle)
2. Dean lied. (Problem situation)
3. Therefore, Dean’s behavior is wrong. (Conclusion)
As you can see, the scientific explanation structure that explores facts and the process of judging right and wrong have the same logical structure. Although we have looked at a simple example here, even if we consider various cases, both undergo a deductive process and have a syllogistic structure, and both derive conclusions about specific facts from universal laws or principles. The only difference is that the nature of the object to be explained (the components of inference) is different. The former is a statement about factual phenomena, while the latter is a statement about values through human rational thinking.
The second is that both the process of knowledge growth and the process of value judgment, as described by Popper, are processes of justification. Based on the above, Popper argues for “falsificationism.” Falsification, as Popper defines it, is the demonstration that a theory is false based on empirical evidence. If a prediction is made based on a certain theory, and the results of observation or experimentation differ from the prediction, then the theory is false. Popper regarded this logic of falsification as the most fundamental principle of science and argued that it was the most reliable method of acquiring knowledge from nature. He argues that it is impossible to prove a theory, and that the basic form of scientific knowledge growth is to discard false theories through falsification and continue to propose and falsify new theories (hypotheses). In other words, science is an endless process of “conjecture and falsification.” The process of knowledge growth through “conjecture and falsification” as described by Popper can be summarized as follows.
Scientific activity begins with a problem. Scientists propose new theories or hypotheses based on conjecture to solve this problem. The proposed hypotheses undergo a process of continuous falsification (testing). Theories that cannot withstand attempts at falsification, i.e., theories that are refuted, are discarded, and hypotheses that withstand attempts at falsification are provisionally accepted as valid knowledge until a new theory is discovered. In this way, scientific knowledge develops through a process of conjecture and refutation.
Now, let’s look at the process of value judgment. Value judgment also starts with identifying value issues. Here, value issues are questions such as “Is a certain action, choice, or judgment right or wrong?” and “Is a certain situation good or bad?” In order to evaluate or resolve these value issues, we collect relevant facts, examine whether they are related to the object of evaluation, and then make a provisional evaluation based on generally accepted social norms (value principles). Next, the value principles that serve as the basic assumptions are examined to see if they are acceptable. If the value principles are accepted, the provisional judgment becomes the final judgment. If the value principles are not acceptable, other value principles must be proposed or the provisional judgment must be revised to justify the final judgment. In other words, value judgment is the process of making a justified evaluation.
Looking at the commonalities between the two processes, the first is that they rely on theory. In science, observations are influenced by theory, which is called the “theoretical re-creation of observations,” and in value judgments, we make judgments based on ethical norms (theory) that we commonly accept. Second, scientific knowledge has the attribute of being provisional, and the same is true for value judgments. Third, both undergo a process of testing, and the results determine whether they can be justified. Based on these points, the growth process of value judgments and scientific knowledge can be seen as similar. If there is a slight difference between the two, it is that inductive logic is also partially involved in value judgments. In value judgments, the wider the range of facts that can be used as grounds, the more likely it is that a more appropriate judgment will be made. However, it is clear that the deductive logic advocated by Popper is an important process in value judgments, and the more examples there are in value judgments, the greater the possibility of making correct judgments.
In the second section, we looked at the similarities in logical structure, and in the third section, we will examine the structural identity of the two by comparing the process of examining whether value principles can be accepted in value judgments with Popper’s process of refutation. In the hypothesis-deductive method of inquiry, a hypothesis (theory) is proposed and various facts are observed. At this point, the hypothesis becomes the standard or perspective for observing facts. Each fact is examined to see if it can refute the hypothesis. In other words, the hypothesis provides a standard for what to focus on when observing. In value judgments, “value principles” serve as the criteria corresponding to “hypotheses.” Value principles determine whether to accept or reject a hypothesis through the observation of various facts, that is, through the existence of cases that can refute it. In other words, the process of examining whether to accept value principles is the process of examining whether they can be refuted.
The similarities between Popper’s philosophy of science and value judgments can be summarized as follows. First, the structure of value judgments and Popper’s scientific explanation structure have the same logical structure in that they take the form of deduction. Second, value judgments and Popper’s logic of the growth of scientific knowledge are both processes of justification. Third, Popper’s process of falsification and the process of testing value principles have very similar logical characteristics.
Popper’s scientific inquiry methodology is not the essence of scientific methodology, but only one of many methodologies. Therefore, we cannot hastily conclude that the methodology of science and the methodology of ethics are completely the same. However, as discussed above, science, which studies problems of nature, and ethics, which studies problems of human beings, are not fundamentally different in terms of their methodology.
