Is consciousness a material state of the brain or a functional process?

Is consciousness a material state of the brain or a functional process? Explores the nature of consciousness and cognition through theories of identificationism, functionalism, and extended cognition.

 

In psychological philosophy, identificationism views consciousness as identical to the material state of the brain. According to this theory, all mental experiences depend on material states, and the two states are essentially the same. For example, the experience of feeling pain, it is argued, corresponds directly to a specific brain state. Through this view, identitarianism emphasizes the neuroscientific basis of consciousness and considers the material basis important in explaining the phenomenon of consciousness.
Functionalism, on the other hand, argues that consciousness is defined by its functional state, not its physical state. In other words, consciousness is a state that performs a specific function, and the same function can be realized in different substances. A function in functionalism is defined as a functional role that produces a specific output given some input, and functional role matching means that the pairs of inputs and outputs match. For example, if a robot composed of silicon chips has the function of producing pain as an output in response to an input of being stabbed, then the robot and we have the same consciousness. In this way, functionalism says that it doesn’t matter what material embodies consciousness.
Searle offers a thought experiment to refute functionalism. Imagine a “Chinese room” with only one person in it who doesn’t know Chinese. He takes input in Chinese and produces output in Chinese according to a set of rules. According to the theory, the person in the room has the same functional role as a Chinese speaker, but does not know Chinese. This is an example of the limitations of functionalism. This is an example of the limitations of functionalism, pointing out that having the same function does not necessarily mean having the same consciousness.
Identificationism, functionalism, and theories all limit the discussion of consciousness to the internal parts of the body that embody consciousness. However, one aspect of consciousness, cognition, or “coming to know something,” happens outside of the body. For example, you might look up information you don’t remember by looking at a file on your laptop. Rowlands’ theory of extended cognition is a theory that explains this.
According to him, cognition is a process that creates a “mental state” in the subject. Memories and beliefs are examples of mental states. Mental states represent meaning to the subject without being dependent on anything else. For example, a person who remembers something doesn’t need to rely on anything to know what their memory is. In contrast, a “derivative state” is defined as a state that represents meaning only by relying on the subject’s interpretation or social consensus. In the previous example, the information stored in the notebook is in a derivative state as a list of electronic signals. After being viewed by the subject, the information in the notebook is still derivative. However, after viewing it, the subject has a memory. For Rowlands, the process of cognition is not the conversion of derivative states into mental states, but rather the manipulation of derivative states to create mental states.
The mental state does not extend outside the subject’s body, but rather the cognitive process that generates the mental state extends. This extended cognitive process can only exist if it belongs to a cognitive subject, that is, if it is integrated with a subject that detects changes in the environment and adjusts its behavior accordingly. For Rowlands, there is no such thing as subjectless cognition. Extended cognition theory means that the problem of consciousness is not limited to the body, but extends it outward. It emphasizes the interaction between the subject and the environment, showing that consciousness and cognition don’t just happen internally, but in interaction with the external environment.
Furthermore, Rowlands’ theory opens up new research directions through the convergence of cognitive science and philosophy. This allows us to take a more comprehensive and integrated approach to understanding consciousness and cognition. By emphasizing the importance of interactions with environmental factors in studying cognitive processes, extended cognitive theory fills in gaps that traditional cognitive theories may overlook.
As you can see, identitarian, functionalist, theoretical, and extended cognitive theories differ in the way they deal with consciousness and cognition. These different perspectives play an important role in further understanding and studying consciousness and cognition. Each theory has its own strengths and limitations, and when considered collectively, they bring us closer to understanding the nature of consciousness.

 

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I'm a "Cat Detective" I help reunite lost cats with their families.
I recharge over a cup of café latte, enjoy walking and traveling, and expand my thoughts through writing. By observing the world closely and following my intellectual curiosity as a blog writer, I hope my words can offer help and comfort to others.