Considering its geographical and technical unsuitability, diplomatic issues with neighboring countries, and defense sovereignty concerns, South Korea’s THAAD deployment is inappropriate. Alternative defense systems should be explored.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a defense weapon system that directly intercepts incoming missiles during their terminal phase. It was developed by the U.S. Army as part of the U.S.-led Missile Defense program. Furthermore, its integrated TPY-2 X-band radar detects targets, and the system employs a Hit-to-Kill method to intercept missiles at the final stage of their descent. Discussions on introducing THAAD to South Korea began in 2011 between the US Forces Korea and the Ministry of National Defense. In May 2014, US Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Winnefeld announced that the deployment of THAAD in South Korea was being considered for defense against North Korean provocations. Subsequently, in July 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken also implied the possibility of including THAAD in the Korean Peninsula missile defense system during a Twitter interview. However, the South Korean government has not taken a clear position due to significant controversy, including strong opposition from China and Russia. The South Korean government has previously taken an ambiguous stance: 1) There are no definite plans to introduce THAAD, 2) However, THAAD would be helpful if available, 3) It does not oppose the U.S. Forces Korea introducing it using their own budget. In this situation, the South Korean government should oppose the introduction of THAAD for the following reasons.
First, introducing THAAD to South Korea is geographically and technically unsuitable. The official purpose of THAAD is to defend against North Korean missile provocations. However, when North Korea attacks South Korea, short-range missiles can be sufficiently intercepted. Missiles undergo three main phases after launch: the boost phase, mid-course phase, and terminal phase. THAAD can only defend during the terminal phase. Furthermore, THAAD struggles to intercept at altitudes below 40km. However, ballistic missiles fired from North Korea toward South Korea fly at altitudes below THAAD’s minimum intercept altitude due to the short distance. For example, even if THAAD were introduced as a defense system against North Korean attacks on Japan or Guam, the ballistic trajectory fired by North Korea would already be above 700km altitude when passing over South Korea, beyond THAAD’s intercept range. Furthermore, THAAD is a relatively recent interceptor system, mass-produced only since 2005, and is therefore not perfect. Lockheed Martin, the developer of THAAD, has publicly stated its high hit rate, but this was achieved under optimal conditions and differs significantly from real-world scenarios, casting doubt on its reliability. Lockheed Martin has not disclosed THAAD’s actual warhead interception rate. During the Gulf War, the U.S. military was unable to intercept Iraq’s ballistic missile launches. Should North Korea attack South Korea, it is highly likely to deploy a greater quantity of missiles than during the Gulf War. Therefore, THAAD’s technical and geographical limitations are evident.
Second, the deployment of THAAD in South Korea could be perceived as a threat by Northeast Asian nations. The X-band detection radar of THAAD has a range of approximately 1,000 km, capable of detecting targets as far as China’s Shandong Peninsula, Shanghai, and Beijing. Beyond the radar, THAAD is an upper-tier defense system with an interception altitude of 150 km, enabling attempts to intercept missiles as far as Okinawa and Guam. This could open the door to U.S. military aggression against neighboring countries, leading surrounding nations to express negative views on THAAD deployment in South Korea. On March 16, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Jianchao strongly opposed the THAAD deployment in South Korea, stating that China would sever diplomatic relations with South Korea the moment THAAD is deployed. If diplomatic ties with China, a major export destination for South Korea, are severed, significant economic damage is anticipated. Russia also strongly opposes THAAD, and its introduction could severely damage the cooperative framework with Russia. This could severely damage South Korea’s defense industry development, which relies heavily on Russia. Furthermore, the introduction of THAAD poses a threat to South Korea’s defense sovereignty. Deploying THAAD in South Korea would mean integrating the missile defense systems of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) with South Korea’s own missile defense system. This could result in South Korea’s defense sovereignty effectively being transferred to the USFK.
Third, introducing THAAD deepens military dependence on the United States. While some argue for its introduction due to its superior interception capabilities and the deterrent effect of its mere presence, THAAD is not the only military alternative capable of performing interception and defense missions. South Korea has developed the low-altitude, short-range interceptor missile ‘Patriot’. It also possesses the ‘Arrow’, an upper-tier defense interceptor missile similar to the Israeli-developed THAAD. The Arrow has been deployed since the early 2000s and, through continuous upgrades, demonstrates outstanding accuracy and interception rates. Furthermore, it is evaluated as the most suitable weapon system for the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system. These alternatives can also serve as weapons against neighboring countries and are fully capable of achieving our nation’s defense objectives. The introduction of THAAD would only deepen military dependence on the United States.
The U.S. Forces Korea’s push for THAAD deployment is an unreasonable demand that ignores both South Korea’s political and diplomatic circumstances and the geographical and technical limitations of THAAD itself. Should THAAD be introduced, the political damage from neighboring countries’ scrutiny would be significant. The Korean government maintains strategic ambiguity and the 3NO (No Request, No Consultation, No Decision) policy regarding the installation of THAAD by USFK. While the decision to introduce THAAD is difficult, considering its impact on various diplomatic relationships and its actual contribution to national defense, the domestic introduction of THAAD is inappropriate.
