This blog post analyzes the core of political dynamics by examining how party systems and electoral systems induce or mitigate gridlock, focusing on the differences between presidential and parliamentary systems.
We often witness deadlock states arising from clashes between different political forces in the political process. Generally, deadlock refers to the political process where, despite both the executive branch and the legislature desiring policy changes, their preferences fail to align, preventing legislation. Consequently, existing policies remain unchanged. The institutional characteristics inherent in each country’s form of government have frequently been cited as a primary cause of such deadlock.
In a presidential system, the president and legislature are elected separately, are not subject to mutual impeachment during their fixed terms, and the president exercises broad authority in cabinet operations. These factors create conditions conducive to friction between the president and the legislature. Particularly, the stronger the president’s legislative powers—such as the right to initiate bills—the greater the potential for conflict with the legislature. In this context, gridlock tends to occur more frequently in divided government situations—where the president’s party does not hold a majority in the legislature—than in single-party governments.
Conversely, in parliamentary systems where the majority party forms the cabinet and the legislature holds the power to dismiss it, gridlock occurs much less frequently. This is because even if the majority party fails to secure a majority, it can form a coalition government with minority parties to achieve a majority, the prime minister and cabinet can be replaced according to the decisions of the parliamentary majority, or the prime minister can dissolve parliament to hold early elections and form a new cabinet, thereby avoiding gridlock. For these mechanisms to function stably, strong party discipline must generally be maintained during the formation and dissolution of coalition governments.
A representative example of institutional modification attempted to mitigate presidential system gridlock is France’s semi-presidential system. While identical to the presidential system in directly electing a president with a fixed term, it takes on characteristics of a parliamentary system in that if the president’s party fails to secure a parliamentary majority, the president appoints the leader of the parliamentary majority as prime minister, who then leads the administration. This situation is called a cohabitation government, and in this case, government operations resemble those of a parliamentary system. However, deadlocks can occur if disputes arise between the president and prime minister over the distribution of authority. Conversely, in a minority government situation, the political situation operates almost identically to the presidential system’s operational model. Meanwhile, the French parliament employs a runoff voting system, creating a structure that encourages a two-party system.
In presidential systems, the party system and electoral system also significantly influence deadlock. Regarding the party system, proportional representation promotes a multiparty system, and a multiparty system makes it difficult to form a stable majority in parliament. In countries with a bicameral legislature, the likelihood of a divided government increases if the majority parties in the upper and lower houses are different, or if either chamber’s majority party differs from the president’s party. Furthermore, if institutional mechanisms exist that strengthen party discipline or if ideological polarization between parties intensifies, the president faces greater difficulty securing majority support from parliament in a divided government scenario. Conversely, holding parliamentary and presidential elections simultaneously can reduce the likelihood of a divided government due to the halo effect of the leading presidential candidate. Moreover, even if a divided government is formed, gridlock does not necessarily occur if the opposition party holds enough seats to override the president’s veto.
The specific structure of the parliamentary system also significantly influences whether gridlock occurs. In systems where the speaker has strong powers to facilitate proceedings, gridlock may arise in a divided government due to the president’s potential to exercise the veto. Furthermore, in institutional structures emphasizing agreement between the majority and minority parties, such as the negotiation bloc system, gridlock can occur even in a divided government. This is because the minority party can use procedural tools to delay the agenda pursued by the majority party. Moreover, filibustering (speeches obstructing parliamentary proceedings), which the minority party employs as a legislative delay strategy, is also a prime cause of gridlock. When the quorum required to end a filibuster is set excessively high, deadlock becomes difficult to resolve. The high probability of deadlock occurring when contentious policy issues lacking social consensus are addressed through legislation is also a phenomenon intertwined with these institutional factors.
One approach to mitigate the problem of divided government situations leading to deadlock in presidential systems is the formation of coalition governments, as attempted in several South American countries. This alternative operates the presidential system like a parliamentary system, where a minority president negotiates with the opposition to form a joint cabinet, thereby securing majority support in parliament. Strong party discipline can reduce defections during negotiations, and the president’s strong authority can also positively contribute to maintaining the coalition government. Research has also suggested that holding both parliamentary elections using proportional representation and presidential elections using a runoff system simultaneously increases the likelihood of forming a coalition government. Holding both elections at the same time has the effect of curbing the proliferation of parties. Furthermore, when the presidential election proceeds via a runoff, negotiations between parties intensify between the first round and the runoff, potentially facilitating the formation of a coalition cabinet.
Another approach to mitigate gridlock, as seen in the U.S., involves the president persuading opposition lawmakers to secure majority support for each bill. This method is primarily effective when party discipline is weak and the parliamentary election system is a simple majority single-member district system. Under these conditions, the legislature is typically composed of two major parties, and lawmakers’ political autonomy is high, making it easier for the president to persuade individual legislators. Particularly when the president’s legislative authority is weak, the president feels an even greater need for lobbying to directly influence Congress. All these methods aim to resolve gridlock by the president forming new majority support within Congress.
