This blog post examines the core elements that constitute human welfare. By comparing three perspectives—pleasure, need fulfillment, and objective value—it logically organizes how welfare can be understood.
What does it mean to say that an individual’s level of welfare has improved, or that one person’s welfare level is higher than others’? Answering this question requires an understanding of the nature or requirements of human welfare. Modern moral philosophy presents the following representative positions on this matter.
First, the ‘hedonistic theory’ posits that the degree of pleasure—a psychological state composed of positive feelings—determines the level of welfare. That is, the more pleasure an individual experiences, the greater their welfare. Second, the ‘need-satisfaction theory’ holds that welfare is determined by the extent to which an individual’s desires are fulfilled. When an individual’s desires are realized more fully without frustration, their welfare increases. Third, the ‘Objective Inventory Theory’ posits that the level of well-being is determined by the extent to which a specific list of elements that make an individual’s life good is realized. This list typically includes autonomous achievement, knowledge, close relationships, and aesthetic enjoyment. The intrinsic value of the elements comprising this list is not directly linked to whether they provide pleasure to the individual or are desired by them. Among these, the ‘hedonistic theory’ and the ‘objective list theory’ are substantive welfare theories in that they propose what intrinsic value is. The ‘need-satisfaction theory’ is classified as a formal welfare theory because, while it indicates how to identify what people consider good, it does not define what that ‘good’ itself is.
Among these various welfare theories, the one supported by many economists is the ‘need-satisfaction theory’. Economists believe this theory allows for evaluating the relative levels of welfare. They also criticize the ‘hedonistic theory’ as overly narrow for addressing the concept of welfare, arguing that activities or events we intuitively associate with increased welfare do not necessarily involve the psychological state of pleasure. They contend a more open perspective is needed. For them, what matters is that the object of desire is realized in reality; whether the realization is recognized and induces a specific feeling in the individual is not an essential element. Advocates of this theory also criticize the ‘objective list theory’ as having limitations. While it can be acknowledged that items included on the list generally contribute to an individual’s well-being, the explanation for why they contribute is insufficient. Furthermore, it is pointed out that there are cases where things individuals actually desire contribute to their well-being even if they are not included in the objective list.
However, the ‘desire fulfillment theory’ also has the following problems. First, while the fulfillment of desires is somewhat associated with well-being, not all desire fulfillment contributes to well-being. People may desire things harmful to themselves due to lack of information or mistaken beliefs, and even if what I desire for others’ lives is realized, it may be irrelevant to enhancing my own welfare. Second, there is the problem that arises when people pursue antisocial desires, such as sadistic desires toward others. Third, it is also pointed out as a significant problem that when individuals lack a consistent system of desires and conflicts arise between desires, resolving these conflicts is difficult.
Approaches to address these issues include abandoning the ‘desire fulfillment theory’ and adopting alternative welfare theories, or modifying existing theories. Among these, the ‘rational desire fulfillment theory’ posits that it is not the fulfillment of all an individual’s desires, but only the fulfillment of rational desires—those beneficial to oneself rather than others, based on sufficient relevant information—that contributes to welfare. This stance holds that if what an individual desires is rational, it is inherently good. This theory has the advantage of resolving many of the difficulties faced by the ‘Need Satisfaction Theory’. However, it simultaneously carries the burden of needing to provide a convincing answer to what constitutes a ‘rational’ need. If the proponents of this theory attempt to answer this question, the theory moves beyond being a formal welfare theory and advances to become a substantive welfare theory.
