This blog post examines why the concepts of narrowing and broadening, which arise in the process of legal interpretation, are understood with different meanings even in the same case, highlighting the complexity of the criteria forming legal judgments.
To apply a law defined in general and abstract terms to individual cases, it is essential to concretize the meaning and content of the law through so-called interpretation. To determine whether a new case falls under the regulation of a specific law, comparison with precedents—cases already unquestionably recognized as falling under that law—is necessary. Not only presenting such comparative cases, but also determining which specific comparative perspectives are crucial, falls to interpretation. Broadly speaking, even the simplest application of law, when the law is composed of clear concepts, can be considered the result of interpretation. However, the typical issue arises when a legal provision contains indeterminate concepts, fundamentally normative concepts, or concepts permitting discretionary judgment, leading to disputes over whether its application falls within the possible range of meanings of the text. Interpretive attempts within this range are naturally permissible, but attempts beyond it require separate examination of whether such attempts can be justified.
Considering that the meaning of language is not fixed, some viewpoints argue that the concept of a possible range of meaning for a legal provision does not exist in the first place. Therefore, the approach of distinguishing between the ‘discovery of law’—which is naturally permitted—and the so-called ‘formation of law’—which requires separate justification—by using that range as a baseline is also difficult to say is free from controversy. Moreover, given that all legal application—from the simplest cases to the most contentious—shares the common feature of being the result of interpretive attempts, there is essentially no difference in the nature of the activity aimed at concretizing the meaning of the law, regardless of which side of the baseline it occurs on. For instance, both the discovery and formation of law involve deliberating on the contraction and expansion of the law, as the applicability of the law to a specific case is determined through such judgments. The only distinction that exists is a view that seeks to emphasize the difference between cases where this occurs within the possible range of meaning of the legal text and cases where it inevitably goes beyond that range to fill gaps in the law. Viewed this way, interpretive attempts for legal application can ultimately be described as activities that determine whether a specific case falls under the law’s regulation by reducing or expanding the law, either within or beyond the possible range of meaning of the legal text.
What is interesting is that the very concepts of narrowing and broadening the law are not particularly clear. Particularly concerning penal statutes, these terms sometimes refer to the scope of punishability being reduced or expanded, while other times they denote the scope of the statute’s application becoming narrower or broader. Furthermore, regarding the meaning of legal texts, an interpretation that is linguistically very strict may be understood as narrowing, while an interpretation that adds unstated requirements may be called broadening. On the other hand, imposing restrictions on civil liberties and rights or creating exceptions to legal principles in light of the so-called substantive meaning of the law is sometimes expressed as narrowing. Depending on the doctrine, narrowing and broadening may also be determined by comparing them to the intent of the legislature or the purpose of the law itself.
For example, consider a law that simply states, “Voluntary surrender exempts punishment.” If this is interpreted to mean, “Appearing voluntarily before investigative authorities after the crime has been discovered does not constitute voluntary surrender,” this interpretive attempt constitutes an extension in that it broadens criminal liability, but it constitutes a restriction in that it narrows the scope of the law’s application. Furthermore, if the primary and strict meaning of voluntary surrender is considered limited to ‘before the crime is discovered,’ this aspect constitutes a narrowing of the statutory meaning. However, by adding the unstated element of ‘before the crime is discovered’ as a requirement for sentence exemption alongside voluntary surrender, it constitutes an expansion in terms of grasping the meaning of the statute. Furthermore, while it restricts civil liberties by reducing opportunities for sentence exemption, if the exemption for voluntary surrender is merely an exception to the overarching principle that one must bear responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions, then narrowing the scope of that exception and converging toward the principle can also be seen as an expansion.
Thus, the key concepts guiding legal interpretation and application—namely, the possible range of meaning within a legal text and the attempts to narrow or broaden the law both within and beyond that range—are generally not only unclear in their identity but also subject to doubt regarding their ontological basis. Nevertheless, numerous scholarly theories and judicial precedents continue to affirm the instrumental value of these concepts. This reflects the legacy of legal logic, which has pursued both normative legitimacy and practical utility, within the very process of legal reasoning itself. It demonstrates that these concepts still perform a core function in the realm of legal application and interpretation today.
