In this blog post, we explore why the act of making false promises inevitably contradicts itself the moment it becomes a universal law, and how this logic underpins the concepts of moral duty and the good will, thereby understanding the core of Kantian ethics.
When evaluating the value of our actions, the concept of ‘good will’ is always primary and forms the condition for all other values. To develop this concept of good will, we must first examine the concept of moral duty. All immoral acts perceived as ‘contrary to duty’ will not be considered here, even if they might appear useful under specific intentions. Such acts conflict with duty; therefore, the very question of whether the act ‘arises from duty’ cannot be validly posed within the act itself. An act arising from duty is one grounded solely in what ought to be, without any intervening conditions. Distinguishing acts contrary to duty from those arising from duty is relatively straightforward. However, distinguishing acts ‘conforming to duty’ from those arising from duty is far more difficult. The motives prompting acts conforming to duty are highly diverse; they may stem from the actor’s self-interest or be triggered by emotions like love or compassion.
For example, a doctor who prioritizes personal gain and treats patients diligently to increase income is clearly acting in accordance with duty. Yet, we cannot conclude this action stems from duty merely because the patient appears to be treated fairly. Consider another example: a person with exceptional empathy who actively helps neighbors in distress. While their actions align with duty and deserve praise, they do not inherently possess moral value. This is because the act stems solely from a character trait. Even if an empathetic act is dutiful and worthy of commendation, it does not automatically become an object of moral respect.
However, if this philanthropist, having lost his capacity for empathy due to brain damage, still helps others solely because he perceives it as a duty, then his actions finally become truly morally valuable. Actions arising from duty do not derive their moral value from the expected results, but from the will that determines the action.
Results may be achieved by other causes and do not necessarily require the will of a rational being. Conversely, the unconditional highest good can only be found in the will of a rational being. For this reason, only the representation of the law—that is, thought of the law itself—constitutes the supreme good we call moral. Of course, as long as the representation of the law, not the expected result, is the basis for determining the will, this representation arises only in rational beings. Since this supreme good already exists in the person acting according to the law, we should not expect that good from the result. From the perspective of such supreme good, the subjective principle of a person making false promises cannot be a universal law applicable to all. If one seeks to make false promises a universal law of action, a contradiction arises where no promise can hold. That is, the agent’s subjective principle self-destructs the moment it becomes a universal law.
To declare the will that determines an action simply and without restriction as good, one must consider only the representation of the law itself in determining the will, disregarding the expected consequences derived from it. If one removes every impulse that might arise in the will when adhering to any law, what remains is only the universal lawfulness of action in general, and this alone must become the principle that gives rise to the will. In other words, I must act only in a manner that satisfies this condition, so that I can desire my subjective principle to become a universal law.
