In this blog post, we examine whether human cloning technology is a field that must be researched for the advancement of life sciences, despite the ethical controversies and risks involved.
Since Watson and Crick elucidated the structure of DNA in 1953, biotechnology and genetic engineering have advanced rapidly. As a result, humans have reaped benefits such as the development of treatments for various diseases and the availability of GMO foods. While advancements in the life sciences bring great convenience to humanity, the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep in 1997 sparked concerns about human cloning technology. However, human cloning technology is essential for the advancement of life sciences. The potential benefits humans can gain from its application are limitless. For example, human embryo cloning enables organ transplants without rejection, thereby improving the quality of life for more patients. Furthermore, it can play a crucial role in researching and treating the genetic causes of rare genetic diseases. Therefore, human cloning technology must move beyond mere experimentation to establish itself as a technology with practical medical value.
In this article, I will examine the arguments of Hillary Putnam and Aline Coleman, scholars who oppose human cloning technology, and refute them in an effort to alleviate societal fears regarding human cloning technology.
First, let us examine Putnam’s argument. Putnam envisions a society where human cloning technology becomes widespread, and the majority of couples utilize it simply because they want a child who looks exactly like themselves. He argues that selecting a child of a specific type reduces the child to an object of the parents’ desired lifestyle, which contradicts Kant’s assertion that human beings must not be treated merely as means. Furthermore, he argues that in such a society, a uniform family model would emerge in which all family members are genetically similar, which would cause problems similar to those seen in Nazi Germany—which rejected racial diversity—or in Scandinavia, where eugenics theories were used to justify sterilization laws targeting “unfit” individuals. Putnam emphasizes the value of children’s unpredictability and diversity, asserting that a family model incorporating these values aligns with the moral standards required by a democratic society.
Let us refute Putnam’s argument. Even if human cloning technology becomes available, the society Putnam envisions will not materialize. Given that Putnam cited the examples of the Nazis and Scandinavia, the society he envisions likely stems from eugenic thinking. However, consider the case of cosmetic plastic surgery. Cosmetic surgery could also be viewed as stemming from eugenic ideas, yet far more people do not undergo such procedures. Similarly, even if human cloning technology becomes available, the society Putnam envisions will not emerge. Furthermore, since our society has already experienced histories such as the Nazis and Scandinavian sterilization laws and recognizes them as wrong, it is unlikely that a pursuit of a uniform family model will reemerge.
Furthermore, just because a technology exists does not mean everyone will use it. Just as the majority of people choose not to undergo cosmetic surgery despite its widespread availability, there will still be many who choose not to use human cloning technology even if it advances. The likelihood of a homogenized society where every member uses a single type of technology is low, and individual choice and autonomy will still be guaranteed.
Of course, there may be a small number of couples who choose to have a child that closely resembles themselves. But is making a child look exactly like its parents, as Putnam suggests, morally wrong? Kant argued that in an ideal family, members do not exist merely to serve the parents’ purposes; rather, they regard one another as ends in themselves, respecting each other as human beings whose plans and happiness matter. Hegel, too, held that parents should guarantee their children’s autonomy. Putnam argues that if we accept these values and apply them to family ethics, the value of willingly embracing diversity must also be included, and human cloning is an act that violates this. However, this argument is incorrect. This is because accepting uniformity in a situation where one can accept it is difficult to view as an act of unwillingly embracing diversity. Furthermore, it cannot be said that giving birth to a child who looks exactly like oneself infringes upon the child’s autonomy. This is because not every child determines how they will be formed based on their own autonomy.
Second, let us examine Coleman’s argument. Coleman argues that research on human cloning should not be attempted because it is unsafe and inefficient. Creating the cloned sheep Dolly required hundreds of cell fusions, and many embryos were discarded. Coleman argues that if human cloning were attempted, countless embryos would likewise be discarded, and surrogate mothers and biological parents would suffer physical and psychological distress. He also suggests that a child born after such a grueling process might suffer from severe deformities. He argues that even if we were to refine the technology by first testing it on other animals to address these issues before applying it to humans, safety cannot be guaranteed due to significant genetic differences between mammalian species. Furthermore, he contends that even in cases where human cloning technology is used to prevent women with defective mitochondria from passing them on to their children, the risks of the nuclear transfer process far outweigh the benefits, making such use unjustifiable. In other words, the conclusion is that human cloning is unethical regardless of the form it takes.
Among Coleman’s arguments, the physical and psychological suffering of surrogate mothers can be resolved through the development of in vitro culture technology. In vitro culture is a technique for cultivating human embryos outside the mother’s body; currently, a team led by Magdalena Zernicka-Goetz, a professor in the Department of Physiology at the University of Cambridge in the UK, has successfully cultured embryos for 13 days. Although 13-day culture has not yet been achieved, if this technology advances, human embryo cloning for organ transplantation will be possible without a surrogate mother. Furthermore, chimpanzees—the species most closely related to humans in evolutionary terms—are currently being cloned. If we continue to refine the technical proficiency of this technology using animals similar to humans, human cloning technology could eventually achieve a level of safety where the risks do not outweigh the benefits.
Finally, the ethical concerns raised as human cloning technology advances are already being addressed as similar issues in various scientific fields. When stem cell research and gene editing technologies first emerged, there was significant opposition and concern, but researchers have strengthened ethical standards and improved safety to overcome these challenges. If human cloning undergoes a similar development process, it will pave the way for human society to safely utilize cloning technology within a new ethical framework.
In the main body of this paper, I examined the arguments against human cloning put forth by Putnam and Coleman, refuted them, and proposed solutions to their concerns. I hope that through this, our society can alleviate, even if only slightly, the fear and hostility surrounding human cloning technology. Human cloning technology has the potential to contribute significantly to the advancement of life sciences. Let us not oppose this technology out of ethical or instinctive fear. Humanity has always advanced science and technology and successfully resolved the problems that arise from them. Now is the time to advance human cloning technology.
