Should legal interpretation emphasize linguistic clarity or consider social context and purpose? The theories of Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart and Lon Luvois Fuller will be explored to answer these questions.
Interpreting law means clarifying the content of a legal rule and determining its scope of application. However, even if a rule of law works well in many cases, it can be problematic in some cases because its applicability is unclear. One of the first people to discuss legal interpretation with this in mind was jurist Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. To understand Hart’s argument, it’s important to recognize the open structure of law. An open structure means that the meaning of language is fixed in the core cases where the rules of law clearly apply, but the meaning of language is indeterminate in marginal cases. Hart believes that most rules in language, like rules of law, are bound to have this open structure. This is because the nature of language is open-ended, and it is impossible to know all possible future events, so the applicability of a rule cannot be completely determined in advance.
For example, when we create a rule that says “no mopeds in the park” for the sake of quiet and peace in the park, the language used in this context determines the conditions that must be met for a case to fall within the scope of the rule. In the author’s mind, there are obvious examples like cars and buses that are within the scope. But it’s hard to envision whether toy cars are included. The question of whether the quiet and peace of the park should take precedence over children having fun with toy cars may also have been unforeseen, so it is difficult to determine whether it is permissible based on the preceding rule alone.
Hart believed that when the meaning of a rule of law is definite, there is no need to consider other factors specifically, and that rules of law are often definite in meaning. However, he argued that when a case arises where a rule of law is not clearly applicable, judges cannot resolve the issue by logical reasoning based on the law, but can exercise discretion to consider extra-legal factors such as social purpose, policy, etc. In his view, judges perform a rule-making function because they set precedents that establish the meaning of borderline cases.
Lon Luvois Fuller criticized Hart’s approach to statutory interpretation for focusing too much on individual words, arguing that the context of a statutory rule and the purpose it is intended to serve are fundamentally important when interpreting the law, meaning that judges should consider the context and purpose of a rule prohibiting riding throughout the interpretation process, not only when the meaning of riding is indeterminate. Fuller illustrates this with the example of one person telling another to teach children to play, and the other person teaching children to play dice for money. Even if the speaker’s original purpose of teaching children to play is not specifically established, it can be interpreted that the object to which play refers does not include playing dice because it is to be interpreted in a way that embodies the universal purposes of humanity.
Fuller further emphasized the purpose of legal interpretation, arguing that rules of law should not be applied literally, but should take into account the nature of the law and the ethical standards of human society. He argued that legal rules are only a means to an end in themselves, and that we should not lose sight of the ultimate goals of the law, such as justice, fairness, and social stability. In this view, legal interpretation is a task that goes beyond mere linguistic analysis and requires a comprehensive consideration of the social, historical, and cultural context.
On the other hand, Fuller understood that Hart’s theory that the law should be interpreted by focusing on the language of the legal rule was a warning against the dangers of overemphasizing the purpose of the legal rule. The rule of law is impossible if it cannot be clearly established in advance what behavior is prohibited and permitted by law. For this reason, while Hart emphasized the linguistic clarity of the law, Fuller held that statutory interpretation should be based on a comprehensive consideration of the purpose and context of the law.
In conclusion, statutory interpretation is a balancing act between the linguistic clarity of the law and the ultimate purpose of the law. The arguments of jurists Hart and Fuller offer different perspectives on how to strike this balance. Hart emphasizes linguistic clarity in order to maintain the rule of law, while recognizing the uncertainty that arises at the boundaries of legal rules through the open structure of language. Fuller, on the other hand, emphasized the purpose and context of the law and argued that legal interpretation should be directed toward the implementation of social ethics and justice. These two perspectives provide important criteria for interpreting the law, and can lead to fairer and more consistent judgments in applying the law.
