In this blog post, we examine the institutional conditions under which consensus-based and majoritarian democracies produce different policy outcomes, and analyze how differences in power structures affect representativeness and efficiency.
Democratic systems are classified as “consensus-based democracies” and “majoritarian democracies” based on the degree to which power is concentrated, decentralized, or shared. The former is a system that maximizes the majority by expanding the number of political actors sharing power and operates the government based on broad consensus among them. In contrast, the latter is characterized by a single-party government that comes to power through a majority rule and exercises exclusive power to govern, while ensuring clear accountability.
Liepert systematically analyzed the characteristics of consensus democracy in countries where society is pluralistic—based on ethnicity, religion, language, and other factors—and where coalition governments among parties representing these groups are commonplace. He measured the institutional patterns of power concentration or decentralization by applying the “party-executive” axis and the “unitary-federal” axis. The former axis includes the party system, electoral system, form of government, relations between the legislature and the executive, and the interest group system, while the latter axis considers the degree of decentralization, unicameral versus bicameral structure, the difficulty of amending the constitution, the independence of constitutional courts, and the existence and independence of the central bank.
Each factor exhibits contrasting tendencies depending on the degree of power concentration or decentralization inherent in the system. For example, countries with a relatively large number of political parties, high proportionality between votes and seats in parliament, a high proportion of coalition governments, weak executive powers, and a system where local interest group representation is centralized at the national level are assessed as exhibiting more consensual tendencies. Conversely, countries where power is strongly concentrated in the central government—such as those with a unicameral legislature—where the difficulty of amending the constitution is as low as that of amending ordinary laws, where the judiciary’s independent authority to review constitutionality is weak, and where the central bank’s independence is limited, are assessed as exhibiting stronger majoritarian tendencies.
The two systems also differ in terms of policy outcomes. While consensus-based democracy does not show significant differences in economic growth, it is considered relatively superior in areas such as socioeconomic equality, political participation, and the reduction of corruption. The empirical finding that power-sharing—which may appear unstable at first glance—actually faithfully embodies the fundamental values of democracy has attracted significant attention. For this reason, attempts to adopt consensual political systems are emerging not only in newly independent nations with deep social divisions but also in advanced nations traditionally classified as majoritarian democracies.
However, the decentralization and sharing of power are not necessarily superior to the concentration of power. When designing a nation’s political system, it is necessary to carefully consider the centrifugal and centripetal forces inherent in each institution, as well as the effects of their interactions. This can be examined through the constitutional design of the presidential system. Here, two key axes come into play: “the president’s sole authority” and “the alignment or separation of objectives” between the president and the legislature.
First, the president’s constitutional and legal powers have a significant impact on the structure of cooperation with the legislature. The stronger the president’s powers, the more the president becomes the ultimate decision-maker on policy, making it difficult for minority parties to secure policy influence through power-sharing. Conversely, when presidential powers are weak, the president requires the legislature’s cooperation for efficient policy implementation, and in this process, minority parties are actively considered as potential coalition partners.
Second, the alignment or divergence of objectives refers to the extent to which the President and the parliamentary majority share similar political preferences, respond jointly to the demands of the social majority, and can assume shared responsibility. Key institutional factors influencing this alignment of objectives include parliamentary seat allocation rules, differences in the electoral cycles of the President and Parliament, variations in constituency sizes, and the characteristics of the presidential election system. For example, a simple-majority single-member district system for the legislature, simultaneous presidential and legislative elections, matching constituency sizes for both bodies, and a presidential runoff system tend to increase the alignment of objectives; when these elements combine, they strengthen the majoritarian centripetal force of government power. As a result, efficient accountable politics is promoted, but there is also a possibility of increased exclusive exercise of power by a single party.
Conversely, proportional representation, separate elections, differences in constituency sizes between the president and the legislature, and a simple majority electoral system for the presidency create a divergence between the social majorities represented by the president and the legislature, thereby increasing the separation of purposes. When these elements are combined, they strengthen the centrifugal forces of government power. In this case, while the need for power-sharing through consensus among political actors increases, there is also a risk of heightened political deadlock due to an excessive dispersion of power, which leads to a greater number of veto players.
Existing studies have generally recommended strengthening presidential powers when the separation of purposes is high and, conversely, reducing presidential powers when the convergence of purposes is high. However, the actual effects produced by institutional combinations can vary depending on which institutional elements are combined and the political and social environment in which those combinations operate. Given these complex interactions, the design of democratic systems must go beyond a simple choice between power concentration and decentralization; it must carefully analyze the dynamics created by structural combinations of institutions to ensure sustainable political stability and representativeness.
