In this blog post, we will explore the impact of human cloning technology on bioethics and identity, and consider whether it is truly a beneficial choice for humanity.
Since the birth of Dolly the sheep, the debate over applying genetic cloning technology to humans has persisted for a long time. Among those who hold a positive view of human cloning is John Harris. He outlined his views in his book *The Genetic Revolution and Bioethics*. The development of biotechnology is progressing at such a groundbreaking and rapid pace that it has earned the label “Genetic Revolution,” and Harris advocates for human cloning through this revolution while criticizing opponents who raise concerns about human rights and ethical issues. While I believe John Harris’s philosophical perspective on cloning from the standpoint of freedom is somewhat valid, I cannot accept most of the arguments and evidence presented in favor of human cloning. I intend to refute the issues he overlooks and his line of reasoning, and by synthesizing the views of leading scholars in genetics, philosophy, law, and medicine—such as Hillary Putnam, Ruth Ditch, and Alan Coleman, who oppose human cloning—I aim to articulate why human cloning should not be attempted.
John Harris takes a critical view of the public opinion held by opponents of human cloning and the resolution on cloning issued by the European Parliament. The European Parliament stated that human cloning cannot be justified under any circumstances. To summarize the rationale: “Human cloning violates human equality in that it implicitly allows for the selection of race. Furthermore, it can undermine and infringe upon human dignity by requiring experimentation on humans.” This largely aligns with the public opinion opposing human cloning. However, Harris criticizes the arguments of opponents of human cloning, claiming that most lack proper reasoning and justification. He argues that while they make vague references to human rights and fundamental principles, they fail to provide concrete examples of how these rights and principles are actually violated. In short, he suggests that they make claims that appear universally correct on the surface but lack any real-world examples to back them up. Harris argues that there are no cases where principles such as respect for human dignity and the safeguarding of genetic material—which he cites as examples of human rights and fundamental principles—have been violated. However, I disagree. It is important to recognize that the reason Harris claims there are no cases where human dignity and the safeguarding of genetic material have been violated by human cloning is simply because no actual human cloning experiments have yet been conducted.
Why have proponents and opponents of human cloning been divided and locked in debate ever since the cloned sheep Dolly was successfully cloned? Given that the feasibility and success rate of human cloning remain unknown, people are expressing their views because humanity does not yet know whether it is morally right or acceptable to proceed with human cloning. If human cloning were to be carried out under the current circumstances, the results of such experiments would constitute the first instance of the violation of human rights and fundamental principles that Harris sought to prevent.
Harris has stated that the arguments of opponents of human cloning mostly lack proper reasoning and justification. He adopts an attitude of not understanding how human rights would be violated or what negative impact it would have on the perception of human dignity. He believes that with sufficient advancements in biotechnology and a shift in public perception, there is no reason why human cloning should be socially rejected. However, I do not believe that creating new life requires so much reasoning and justification. If there is even the slightest possibility that it could harm the newly created life, that alone is sufficient reason. Furthermore, if the act of creating new life has the potential to cause additional harm to others or create a negative social atmosphere and public sentiment, that too can be a sufficient reason for opposition. Human cloning falls under both of these categories. A child born through human cloning can never be safer than a child born through normal reproductive processes. According to Alan Coleman, in the case of the cloned sheep Dolly, over 430 cell fusion attempts were made, resulting in 277 reconstructed embryos. Of these, only 29 survived to the stage of being implanted into a sheep’s uterus, and among those, only one resulted in a successful birth. Furthermore, the cloned sheep Dolly did not live as long as a typical sheep. This indicates that the success rate of cloning is extremely low, meaning that in the case of human cloning, many embryos would inevitably have to be discarded. The physical and psychological suffering of the surrogate mother cannot be ignored either. Furthermore, cloned humans born through human cloning face a higher risk of developing cancer and premature aging as they grow older. While one might proceed with human cloning after concluding that safety is 100% based on sufficient animal testing, no one can predict the outcome because there are significant differences between animals and humans in terms of reproductive physiology and embryology. When we consider a child born with deformities (or even a seemingly normal child) as a product of the cloning process—and think about the hardships they will face, the social group they will belong to, how their identity will form, and the worry of unspecified genetic diseases that may arise in the future—it is clear that this is universally wrong. The crucial point is that, sadly, if such a phenomenon were to occur, the birth of a cloned human would likely remain unknown to the public for several years. This is because it is obvious that it would face public condemnation. Proponents may argue that new medical advancements inevitably carry potential risks and that no progress can be made if we prioritize safety alone. It is an undeniable fact that animal testing is conducted for this very reason. However, I believe what we must consider first is the balance between the risks and the resulting public benefit. Many people argue that the natural sciences should not be developed solely for their utility. They contend that scientific and technological progress should be promoted regardless of whether it is useful or not. However, the issue of human cloning is inevitably sensitive because it involves human life. Consider a best-case scenario in which a cloned human is successfully born, survives, and lives a normal life. I question whether the benefits gained in such a scenario—such as cloned humans serving as organ donors, providing blood without the risk of rejection, or the birth of children with desired traits—are truly important and necessary enough to justify taking on the immense risks and ethical concerns I mentioned earlier.
Social problems are also inevitable. It is still too early for our society to accept cloned humans as no different from any other human. This means that even if a cloned human were to be successfully born, it would be difficult for them to integrate into our society without reservation. This is clearly evident when we consider the meaning of family as humanity currently views it. Diversity is a value we are willing to embrace and acknowledge. From a couple’s perspective, the unpredictability and excitement of not knowing what kind of child will be born, along with that child’s diversity, are essential values for humanity to form and sustain family societies. However, when comparing a family composed of cloned humans to the family structure we currently consider ideal, it is not difficult to predict how the public will react. While people might say it’s acceptable on the surface, deep down they may question, “Is that really a true family?” Reflecting this social sentiment, some countries have enacted laws regarding cloned humans. For example, the United Kingdom legally prohibits the creation of embryos or the raising of children produced through nuclear transfer technology.
Harris emphasizes reproductive autonomy and argues that banning reproductive cloning is, in fact, a suppression of individual freedom regarding reproduction. However, I question whether reproductive autonomy can justify government non-interference in human cloning, and whether it is a right that must be guaranteed even at the cost of public disapproval and scientific risks. If Harris’s argument were valid, acts such as incest, bestiality, and adultery should not have been considered social problems in the past. Yet these acts are illegal in most countries. This suggests why Harris’s argument is difficult for society to readily accept.
Harris also presented eight case studies to question whether human cloning is unethical and undermines human rights and dignity. The cases he cited include situations where infertile couples or single individuals who have lost a spouse wish to have children carrying their own genetic material, or where couples at high risk of hereditary diseases seek to have healthy children through cloning. The cases Harris presented generally concern individual freedom and desire. However, I question whether such freedoms can justify the biological risks and negative social impacts arising from human cloning, or the selfish desire to pass on one’s genes to a child despite the availability of adoption as an alternative. I believe that if individual freedom is likely to harm the public interest or cause harm to others, it can be restricted.
Finally, regarding the argument that embryos with specific genes should be cloned and used to treat serious diseases such as AIDS, I question whether this can serve as an appropriate example in a context where human cloning is opposed.
Thus far, I have refuted John Harris’s arguments in favor of human cloning and incorporated some of the views of opponents of human cloning, including Hilary Putnam, Ruth Ditch, and Alan Coleman. The views of Hilary Putnam, who presented a socially desirable model of the family; Ruth Ditch, who analyzed human cloning from the perspectives of public perception and practical realities; and Alan Coleman, who highlighted the risks of cloning from a scientific standpoint, have helped me clarify my opposition to human cloning. While modern society respects individual freedom, we now need to extend this individuality to encompass the concept of social responsibility. In this regard, human cloning demands an ethical burden and responsibility that is too great to be borne by individual freedom alone. Considering social responsibility, the human rights of the child to be born, and public reaction, I believe our society is not yet ready for human cloning. Just as eating too quickly can cause indigestion, forcing ourselves to tackle something that is premature will make it difficult to handle the resulting social repercussions. I believe that human cloning is not only premature but also a realm that must not be touched, as it concerns the dignity of human life.
