In this blog post, we will examine various perspectives on the absoluteness of scientific theories and consider, based on the philosophy of science and historical examples, whether scientific theories must necessarily be absolute.
Some people believe that scientific theories must be absolute. Here, “absolute” refers to a state that is free from value judgments, possesses mathematical necessity and certainty, and maintains an immutability that does not change with time or space. Those who hold this position argue that an absolute reality exists, and since scientific theories express this reality through the process of recording it or discovering its laws, scientific theories must also be absolute. Furthermore, since value judgments come into play only at the stage of actually applying scientific theories, they view scientific theories themselves as containing absolute knowledge that is independent of value judgments. However, must scientific theories truly be absolute? In this paper, we first examine opposing positions regarding the absoluteness of scientific theories. Next, by examining the meaning of absoluteness in the philosophy of science and the characteristics of scientific theories, this paper argues that scientific theories cannot fully align with the concept of absoluteness. Furthermore, drawing on historical examples, this paper demonstrates that scientific theories formed and accepted to date do not possess absoluteness, and thus seeks to argue that scientific theories do not necessarily have to be absolute.
Questions regarding the absoluteness of scientific theories have been raised for a long time and remain one of the major points of contention in the philosophy of science today. This debate is most clearly illustrated by the difference between rationalism—which holds that scientific theories should be evaluated according to a single universal standard transcending time and space—and relativism—which holds that the value judgments of individuals or communities influence the formation and evaluation of scientific theories. Rationalists argue that there exists a single rational standard characterized by universality and timelessness for evaluating scientific theories. Furthermore, they view theories that satisfy such a standard as true, or closer to the truth, or at least provisionally true. Underlying this position is the premise that truth and rationality are inherently valuable; since truth is unchanging and independent of value, they believe that the criteria for judging it must also possess universality and ahistoricity.
In contrast, relativists argue that there is no absolute standard that inevitably leads scientists to the same conclusion. They contend that a scientist’s decision-making process inevitably involves personal values or the value judgments of the scientific community, and therefore, scientific theories are also deeply intertwined with such value judgments. Consequently, they view the criteria for distinguishing science from non-science as not absolute but rather as having been formed within social and historical contexts. Of course, they acknowledge that scientific theories may be highly valued in a particular era or community, but they argue that it is difficult to view scientific theories as having an absolute hierarchy of superiority or inferiority. Thus, the debate over the absoluteness of scientific theories centers on whether scientific theories are independent of value judgments.
To examine why scientific theories do not fully align with absoluteness, let us first review the limitations of the absolute standards proposed by rationalists. Rationalists present universality and ahistoricity as key characteristics of absolute criteria, but even these criteria cannot be considered entirely absolute. The universality referred to by rationalists implies that natural laws apply generally and are not limited to specific times or places. However, in actual scientific practice, an existing theory is not immediately discarded simply because a single anomalous case is discovered. This is because anomalous cases can arise from various causes—not only the theory itself but also observational conditions or measurement processes. Therefore, rather than discarding an existing theory based on a single case, scientists revise or supplement it through repeated verification and problem-solving processes. This process demonstrates that scientific theories are always provisional in nature. Furthermore, since the judgment and consensus of the scientific community influence, to some extent, the process of determining what should be recognized as universal, universality cannot be viewed as a concept completely separate from value judgments.
“Ahistoricity,” another characteristic of absolute standards cited by rationalists, also does not fully align with the actual nature of scientific theories. Ahistoricity implies that truth is independent of contemporary values; thus, scientific theories must be formed and evaluated independently of the values of their time. However, scientific theories are not truth itself but rather the result of interpretations formed during the process of seeking truth. Science has evolved through a repetitive process of accumulating new knowledge and revising existing theories. Furthermore, scientific theories do not merely list individual facts but are interconnected with various other theories to form a single structured system. For these reasons, scientific theories develop over a long period through the research and discussions of countless scientists, and the experiences and academic values of their era are inevitably reflected in this process. For a scientific idea to transcend a mere individual thought and be recognized as a scientific theory, it requires verification and endorsement by many researchers. Therefore, it is difficult for a scientific theory to be formed while completely excluding the historical accumulation of a specific era and the scientific community. Considering this, it is not easy for a scientific theory to satisfy the condition of ahistoricity in an absolute sense.
Next, examining the characteristics of scientific theories reveals that they cannot fully align with the concept of absoluteness. Scientific theories cannot be considered absolute even at the data-collection stage. Scientists collect data through numerous experiments and observations, interpret it, and use it to construct scientific theories. However, this process involves making judgments about how to collect data and which phenomena to observe. Such value judgments do not merely pertain to issues of research ethics regarding the selection or exclusion of data. This is because the process of data collection itself depends on how humans perceive external information. Humans perceive external information through their sensory organs, but the information perceived by these organs is not exactly the same for everyone.
A prime example is the photo of the dress that became a major global sensation in 2015. Even when looking at the same photo, some people perceived the dress as black and blue, while others saw it as white and gold. This example demonstrates that even when viewing the same object, the information perceived can vary from person to person. Such differences can also affect observation and data collection.
Furthermore, ultrasound generally refers to sound waves with frequencies higher than the audible range that humans can hear. However, the human audible range can vary depending on factors such as age and individual differences. Ultimately, the criterion of the audible range itself is a relative concept based on human senses. Although science utilizes various measuring instruments and standardized experimental procedures to overcome these limitations, observation and measurement cannot be completely separated from the human perceptual system. This fact demonstrates that even the data collection process, which forms the foundation of scientific theory, cannot fully align with absoluteness.
Finally, even from a historical perspective, scientific theories have never been absolute. Looking at past examples of “normal science,” we can see that the historical and cultural contexts of numerous scientists and societies influenced the process by which a single scientific idea gained widespread acceptance and became established as normal science. A prime example is Copernicus’s heliocentric theory, which today forms the foundation of modern astronomy but, at the time, failed to replace the existing geocentric theory for a long period. Due to limitations in observational technology and computational accuracy at the time, the early heliocentric theory did not always provide a better explanation than the geocentric theory; it gradually gained scientific credibility through the research of Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and others. Thus, in the process of accepting a new scientific theory, not only scientific evidence but also the research environment and the evaluation by the scientific community play important roles.
Thomas Kuhn explained this process, arguing that scientific revolutions occur through consensus within the scientific community and paradigm shifts. This demonstrates that the evaluation of scientific theories is not determined solely by absolute criteria; rather, the social evaluation by the scientific community and the historical context also exert significant influence. Furthermore, Imre Lakatos explained that it is difficult to present individual scientists with absolute selection criteria when choosing between competing research programs. Ultimately, it is difficult to explain all real-world scientific activities using only the absolute criteria proposed by rationalism. Current scientific theories are no exception. Even theories accepted as “normal science” today always carry the possibility of being revised or reinterpreted in the future due to the emergence of new evidence or new theories.
We have examined rationalism and relativism—two opposing perspectives on the absoluteness of scientific theories—and reviewed the limitations of the absolute evaluation criteria proposed by rationalists. Furthermore, by examining the formation process and characteristics of scientific theories, we observed that they cannot fully align with absoluteness; through historical examples, we confirmed that even scientific theories recognized to date have not existed in an absolute form. Based on this discussion, we were able to conclude that the proposition “scientific theories must be absolute” is not necessarily valid.
Rationalists argue that scientific theories are evaluated according to absolute standards, alternating between progress and regression. However, there are also cases where theories once deemed to have regressed have regained attention with the emergence of new evidence and new perspectives. The history of science has not been a process of simply discarding existing theories, but rather one of repeated revision, supplementation, and new interpretations. Therefore, evaluations that categorize past scientific theories as either successes or failures can also be seen as the result of perspectives and value judgments from later generations.
Of course, today’s philosophy of science does not view scientific theories as either absolute truths or purely relative. While modern science pursues objectivity and testability, it also broadly acknowledges that all theories possess a provisional nature, meaning they can be revised in light of new evidence. This characteristic is not a limitation of science but rather a key driving force enabling its continuous advancement.
Ultimately, scientific theories are systems of knowledge that evolve through constant verification, revision, and criticism. Therefore, scientific theories do not need to be absolute; rather, they must be capable of evolving into more accurate explanations by accepting new evidence and rational criticism. The value of science does not lie in unchanging absoluteness, but rather in the process of constantly verifying and revising itself in an effort to approach the truth.
