In this blog post, we will examine whether the theory of evolution and creationism can be recognized as science, based on major theories in the philosophy of science.
Introduction
A 2012 survey conducted by Gallup Korea found that 45% of respondents believed in the theory of evolution, while 32% believed in creationism, indicating that over 30% did not accept the theory of evolution. Since then, social debate surrounding the theory of evolution and creationism has continued steadily in South Korea.
One of the catalysts for the full-scale controversy was an incident in 2012 when the Committee for the Revision of Evolutionary Theory in Textbooks (hereinafter referred to as the “Committee”) submitted a petition demanding revisions to textbook content. The Committee argued that the description of the Archaeopteryx as an intermediate form between dinosaurs and birds, as well as the narrative on the evolutionary process of horses, were problematic, and demanded revisions to the textbooks. When the education authorities indicated at the time that they would review some of the content, international academic journals also took notice of the issue. Subsequently, the South Korean biology and scientific communities raised official counterarguments against the Committee’s claims, and following expert review, the discussion was resolved in a manner that maintained the scientific accuracy of the textbooks.
Supporters of creationism often explain why the theory of evolution is wrong by focusing on individual cases; conversely, supporters of the theory of evolution frequently fail to provide a philosophical explanation of why evolution is science and why creationism is not. The philosophy of science is the discipline that addresses these issues. It explores the criteria for distinguishing science from non-science and philosophically analyzes the characteristics that science must possess. In this article, we will examine the arguments of prominent philosophers of science and, from their perspective, compare the theory of evolution and creationism to identify the characteristics of each.
The Problem of Demarcation
The philosophy of science begins with the “problem of demarcation”—how to distinguish between science and non-science. The problem of demarcation refers to the criteria or methodology for distinguishing between science and non-science. Some early philosophers believed that a proposition was scientific if it received widespread support. However, this criterion poses the problem of recognizing the beliefs of the majority as science. It also creates the contradiction that even a correct theory may not be recognized as science if many people do not understand it.
In the 20th century, inductivists attempted to resolve the demarcation problem in a different way. They proposed a method of statistically analyzing evidence related to a theory to calculate the probability that the theory is correct. The view is that the higher the probability that a theory is correct, the more scientific it is considered to be. This approach is still widely used in scientific research today. For example, in particle physics, when announcing the discovery of a new particle, scientists do not simply state that it has been discovered; they also present statistical significance. This demonstrates that science values objective evidence and statistical reliability over absolute certainty.
Karl Popper’s “Falsifiability”
In 1934, Karl Popper criticized inductivism, arguing that no matter how much inductive evidence is accumulated, it is impossible to prove that a theory is absolutely true. This is because finite observations alone cannot verify all infinite possibilities. Conversely, a single clear counterexample can demonstrate that a theory is false. For this reason, Popper proposed “falsifiability” as the key criterion distinguishing science from non-science. He argued that a scientific theory must clearly specify under what conditions it could be proven false.
In evolutionary theory, a classic thought experiment often cited is “the discovery of a rabbit fossil from the Precambrian era.” According to modern evolutionary biology, rabbits could not have existed during the Precambrian. Therefore, if such a fossil were actually discovered, evolutionary theory would face a serious falsification. This logic applies equally to all organisms included in the phylogenetic tree. If a fossil of an organism is discovered from an era in which that organism could not have existed, the theory of evolution must be revised or a new explanation must be proposed. In other words, the theory of evolution is a theory that can be sufficiently falsified through empirical evidence.
In contrast, creationism generally argues that “living organisms are too complex to be explained by natural evolutionary processes alone and were designed by an intelligent being.” Regardless of the validity of this claim, it is difficult to establish conditions under which it can be empirically falsified. Creationism does not provide clear criteria for what observational results would be required to acknowledge that the claim is false. Ultimately, the explanation that “God designed it that way” is difficult to falsify empirically and thus fails to meet Popper’s criteria.
Thomas Kuhn’s “Paradigm”
While Popper’s falsificationism provided a meaningful criterion—namely, “falsifiability”—it failed to adequately explain the actual course of scientific history. A review of the history of science reveals that scientists did not immediately discard existing theories simply because a single counterexample was discovered. Noting this, Thomas Kuhn identified the “paradigm” as the key characteristic distinguishing science from non-science.
Most of the history of science corresponds to the period of “normal science.” Normal science refers to a period in which a single dominant theory effectively explains natural phenomena and is accepted as the common research framework within the academic community. This dominant theory shared by the research community is called a “paradigm.” Kuhn viewed a paradigm as having sufficient research capacity if it had successfully solved various problems over a long period. Therefore, he criticized the practice of immediately discarding a theory upon the discovery of a single counterexample as an underestimation of the theory’s potential, calling this “naive falsificationism.”
A prime example is Newtonian mechanics. When first published, Newton’s mechanics could not perfectly explain the motion of the Moon. If Newtonian mechanics had been immediately discarded for that reason alone, subsequent developments in physics would have been difficult to achieve. In reality, science has evolved by revising or supplementing theories even when counterexamples are discovered.
Once a theory establishes itself as a paradigm and enters the era of “normal science,” it serves as the foundation for various research endeavors. However, as time passes and hard-to-explain counterexamples continue to accumulate, the existing paradigm faces a “crisis.” When such a crisis deepens sufficiently, a “scientific revolution” occurs in which a new paradigm replaces the existing one.
A prime example is Ptolemy’s geocentric model. The geocentric model established itself as normal science by predicting the positions of celestial bodies with relative accuracy over a long period. However, as researchers sought to explain various phenomena—such as planetary motion and precession—numerous auxiliary hypotheses were gradually added, causing the theory to become increasingly complex. Eventually, confidence in the existing paradigm waned, and the emergence of Copernicus’s heliocentric model paved the way for a shift to a new paradigm.
Some creationists argue that, just as the heliocentric model replaced the geocentric model, creationism should replace the theory of evolution. However, this argument fails to fully consider the conditions for a paradigm shift as described by Kuhn. In modern biology, the theory of evolution is recognized as a leading paradigm driving diverse research. Furthermore, based on the body of research accumulated to date, the biological community does not assess that the theory of evolution is facing a paradigm crisis. For a new paradigm to emerge, it must be premised on a situation where the existing paradigm can no longer solve problems; however, the current scientific community does not view the situation as such. Therefore, from Kuhn’s perspective, it is difficult to view creationism as an alternative paradigm to the theory of evolution.
Imre Lakatos’s “Scientific Research Programs”
Kuhn’s paradigm theory effectively explained the process of scientific development, but it failed to provide clear criteria for distinguishing which theories represent scientific progress and which represent intellectual regression. On the other hand, Popper’s falsificationism had the limitation that a theory could be discarded before it had fully matured. Imre Lakatos sought to combine the strengths of these two positions while addressing their respective limitations.
Lakatos viewed the science representative of a given era not as a collection of independent, individual hypotheses, but as a single “scientific research program.”
Within a scientific research program, various theories play distinct roles. The central theory forms a “hard core” and, based on this, possesses the “problem-solving capacity” to explain natural phenomena and predict the future. Conversely, when a falsification of the hard core is proposed, various auxiliary hypotheses form a “protective shield” to safeguard the core theory.
Newtonian mechanics is a prime example. Newton’s laws of motion and the law of universal gravitation formed a hard core, explaining the motions of various celestial bodies. However, when it was discovered that these laws could not accurately explain the precession of Mercury’s orbit, some scientists at the time proposed an auxiliary hypothesis assuming the existence of an as-yet-undiscovered planet, “Vulcan.” This hypothesis served as a protective shield to safeguard the hard core.
Where Lakatos went a step further than Kuhn was in proposing criteria for distinguishing between “forward-looking” and “backward-looking” research programs. A forward-looking research program predicts new phenomena that existing theories could not explain or uncovers new facts. Conversely, a backward-looking research program is characterized by continuously adding auxiliary hypotheses to fit already known facts in an attempt to maintain the existing theory.
Einstein’s general theory of relativity is a prime example of a progressive research program. It explained the problem of Mercury’s precession—which Newtonian mechanics could not account for—without resorting to separate auxiliary hypotheses, and several subsequent new predictions were successfully verified.
In contrast, Lakatos cited Marxism as an example of a regressive research program. This is because, when existing predictions did not align with reality, Marxism continually introduced new auxiliary hypotheses in an attempt to avoid falsification. For example, when the prediction that the working class would fall into absolute poverty did not materialize, Marxism sought to maintain the existing theory by adding theories such as imperialism.
From Lakatos’s perspective, evolutionary theory exhibits the characteristics of a progressive research program. Modern evolutionary biology has not only addressed the various limitations of early evolutionary theories but is also being utilized to predict and explain new biological phenomena. For instance, research analyzing the evolutionary patterns of pathogens or predicting the direction of viral mutations is conducted within the theoretical framework of evolutionary biology.
In contrast, creationism is relatively free from such evaluations. Since creationism presupposes that living organisms were designed by an intelligent being, its core tenet is difficult to refute, and it does not require significant additional safeguards. However, this explanation alone makes it difficult to demonstrate the ability to predict new phenomena or solve scientific problems. Therefore, it is not easily evaluated as a research program capable of replacing existing evolutionary theory.
Conclusion
In everyday life, it is generally relatively easy to distinguish between science and non-science. However, in the case of some pseudosciences, it can be difficult to clearly determine what is science and what is not. Creationism can also be viewed as one such example. If debates focus solely on individual cases or specific lines of reasoning without approaching the issue within the broader framework of the philosophy of science, the core issue of whether the theory in question is scientific or not can become obscured.
As examined earlier, comparing the theory of evolution and creationism through the perspectives of prominent philosophers of science allows for a more systematic understanding of the differences between the two theories. From Popper’s perspective, the theory of evolution is a scientific theory that can be falsified by empirical evidence, whereas creationism struggles to provide conditions under which it can be falsified. A high degree of falsifiability means that a theory is open to criticism and verification, which is a crucial element underpinning the objectivity and rationality that science pursues.
In Kuhn’s theory of paradigms as well, the theory of evolution functions as the dominant research framework in modern biology. Considering the body of research accumulated to date, the scientific community does not assess that the theory of evolution is facing a paradigm crisis, nor does it view a new scientific paradigm as having emerged to replace it. Therefore, it is difficult to understand creationism as a paradigm that replaces the theory of evolution.
A similar conclusion can be reached from the perspective of Lakatos’s scientific research programs. Modern evolutionary biology continues to demonstrate its ability to explain and predict new phenomena, and the research program itself continues to evolve. In contrast, creationism struggles to propose new scientific predictions or demonstrate problem-solving capabilities that can be verified through empirical research.
Taking these criteria of the philosophy of science into account, the modern scientific community evaluates the theory of evolution as satisfying the requirements of a scientific theory, whereas creationism is not accepted as a theory verifiable by the scientific method. Therefore, from the perspective of the philosophy of science, it is more appropriate to understand these two positions as explanatory systems of different natures rather than as theories belonging to the same category.
