In this blog post, we explore everything from the simple perception of seeing an apple to cases of change blindness and art appreciation, deeply examining from a philosophical perspective whether sensory experience and judgment can actually be separated.
We see a red, ripe apple and make the judgment: “Yes, that apple looks delicious; let’s eat it with the family.” At this moment, we first have the sensory experience of the red apple. Then we make judgments like “There’s a red apple over there” or “The apple is ripe; it would be nice to eat it together.” This implies that ‘seeing’ is a precondition for ‘believing.’ Judgments and inferences about sensory experience are higher-order cognitive processes and conceptual procedures; sensory experience prior to the intervention of judgment and inference possesses only non-conceptual content. The view that regards this sequence—where non-conceptual sensory experience is given first, followed by judgment and inference—as the normal process is called ‘non-conceptualism.’
Non-conceptualism emphasizes that we actually see more than we notice. For example, we might enjoy a pleasant conversation with our wife over dinner after work without noticing she dyed her hair blonde that day. Only after hearing her reproach do we suddenly realize the dye job and wonder how we could have missed it. This phenomenon of failing to notice such a striking change is called change blindness. It’s hard to believe we truly didn’t see these distinctive changes. A more natural explanation is that we were given a new visual experience but failed to recognize it, and thus it didn’t lead to judgment or inference. We simply didn’t notice our wife’s yellow hair; we can’t say we didn’t see it.
However, ‘conceptualism’ views visual experience and judgment/inference not as separate procedures. When we see something, higher-order cognitive elements like background knowledge, judgment, and inference are already involved in the process. Conceptualism holds that when we perceive a red apple, a kind of cognitive act of interpretation occurs. Seeing what is on the table as a ‘red apple’ is itself an interpretation. We are not conscious of this interpretive act itself, but this processing occurs distributed throughout the brain, and it is a form of judgment and inference.
Conceptualism is also explained through Bernardo Bellotto’s painting “View of Dresden from the Right Bank of the Elbe River.” When viewing this painting in a museum from a suitable distance, one sees several people of slightly different appearances on the bridge depicted in the distance. We might assume the painter used a magnifying glass to render these figures with great precision. But do those speck-like figures truly take human form? Surprisingly, when the bridge section of this painting is enlarged, the people vanish, revealing only paint droplets, stains, and brushstrokes. In a way, the painter may have merely suggested the people crossing the bridge rather than depicting them directly. Nevertheless, our brain interprets and experiences this suggestion as people. This process can be metaphorically called ‘filling in.’ The brain fills in details based on a few clues, leading us to experience seeing various people crossing the bridge in different actions. This ‘filling in’ is also a form of judgment. Since judgment is already involved in our visual experience, visual experience and judgment are inseparable. Therefore, when we perceive people in this picture, it already presupposes interpretation.
So how does conceptualism explain change blindness? According to conceptualism, change blindness—failing to notice the difference between two scenes given in my sensory experience—seems unreasonable. Non-conceptualism asserts that sensory experience exists independently of judgment and inference. Unlike judgment or inference, I have privileged access to my own senses, so I should not be capable of error. Yet, to claim that I fail to recognize changes in my own senses seems contradictory. After all, sensing occurs precisely when one can perceive change.
Ultimately, conceptualism criticizes non-conceptualism for possessing an unfounded confidence that it perceives more than it actually does. Conversely, non-conceptualism views conceptualism as underestimating what it has actually perceived. Thus, the two positions offer differing interpretations based on where they place the boundary between sensory experience and cognitive processes, and the philosophical debate over how our perception is constituted continues.
